The insurgency and its associated links to global terrorist networks represent a grave threat to U.S. national security interests and must be defeated. Our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan include dismatling the networks that provide cover for insurgents and undermine stabilization efforts. These illegal networks prevent the Government of Afghanist from developing a stable, licit economy, providing rule of law to its citizens, and improving governance.
A key enabler that will improve the GOA's ability to deliver services to its people is to disconnect from the insurgency. Our strategy should effectively provide the necessary incentives to wean the people from the insurgeny and connect them with their government.
The drug trade provides a key revenue stream to the insurgency, as it provides weapons and funding that enable insurgent elements to continue their operational activites. Illegal drugs thrive in an environment of insecurity, and areas with limited government and legal economic alternatives. It it no accident that the vast majority of cultivation occurs in southern Afghanistan, where the insurgency is most active. In Helmand, over 66 percent of total cultivation occured in Helmand, which is Afghanistan's most violent province.
Disconnecting the Afghan people from the insurgency will require disconnecting the people from the drug trade. The enormity of the drug trade requires that our strategies be integrated with the larger counterinsurgnecy plan until Afghan law enforcement has the capacity to interdict illegal drug networks inside Afghanistan. The reduction in cultivation and production over the past few years is not the result of successful CN policies and strategies; it is the result of poor weather, lucrative economic alternatives, and key leadership in some areas of the country.
The goal of a
and then connect the people with their democratically elected government. In Afghanistan, the U.S. is engaged in a bidding war with insu
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
March 24 2009
With an additional 17,000 US troops set to deploy to Afghanistan as early as this spring, the US Government must recognize that success will only come with a greater recognition that the Afghan Government must take ownership and accountability for their country.
The US Government must clearly articulate to the GOA that there must be clear time lines and benchmarks for continued assistance to the Afghan mission. Efforts to improve the legitimate economy, dismantle the drug trade, reduce corruption, and improve governance are all limited by the Afghan Government's unwillingness and/or inability to improve transparency and extend their writ to the provinces.
This year in Afghanistan will be a game-changer, with a Presidential election scheduled for August 20, 2009. A credible candidate that will not tolerate corruption and complicity in the burgeoning drug trade and project his influence to the provinces is the right option; Karzai has not demonstrated the ability to accomplish these ends, but there does not appear to be a viable alternative.
While many critics stress that to be successful in Afghanistan a bottom-up approach linking Afghanistan's 365 districts and 34 provinces to Kabul is required, this approach is short-sighted. Yes, the central government's writ does not extend much beyond Kabul, but Afghanistan's future will depend on centrally-led institutions that can project their power and influence beyond Kabul. The Afghan Army is the most respected institution in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan's future stability will depend on the Army's ability to guard against foreign invaders.
The Ministry of Defense, NATO/ISAF, and other contributing partners have agreed that the Army should be expanded from 80,000 to 134,000 by the end of 2010. However, to increase the size of the Army, the GOA will depend on further contributions from international partners for training, mentoring, and equipping the larger force. NATO/ISAF is stretched when it comes to the required number of trainers to facilitate an expanded Army. The GOA can not rely exclusively on the US to provide these trainers, they mus come from other partners.
The US Government must clearly articulate to the GOA that there must be clear time lines and benchmarks for continued assistance to the Afghan mission. Efforts to improve the legitimate economy, dismantle the drug trade, reduce corruption, and improve governance are all limited by the Afghan Government's unwillingness and/or inability to improve transparency and extend their writ to the provinces.
This year in Afghanistan will be a game-changer, with a Presidential election scheduled for August 20, 2009. A credible candidate that will not tolerate corruption and complicity in the burgeoning drug trade and project his influence to the provinces is the right option; Karzai has not demonstrated the ability to accomplish these ends, but there does not appear to be a viable alternative.
While many critics stress that to be successful in Afghanistan a bottom-up approach linking Afghanistan's 365 districts and 34 provinces to Kabul is required, this approach is short-sighted. Yes, the central government's writ does not extend much beyond Kabul, but Afghanistan's future will depend on centrally-led institutions that can project their power and influence beyond Kabul. The Afghan Army is the most respected institution in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan's future stability will depend on the Army's ability to guard against foreign invaders.
The Ministry of Defense, NATO/ISAF, and other contributing partners have agreed that the Army should be expanded from 80,000 to 134,000 by the end of 2010. However, to increase the size of the Army, the GOA will depend on further contributions from international partners for training, mentoring, and equipping the larger force. NATO/ISAF is stretched when it comes to the required number of trainers to facilitate an expanded Army. The GOA can not rely exclusively on the US to provide these trainers, they mus come from other partners.
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