Afghanistan

The insurgency and its associated links to global terrorist networks represent a grave threat to U.S. national security interests and must be defeated. Our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan include dismatling the networks that provide cover for insurgents and undermine stabilization efforts. These illegal networks prevent the Government of Afghanist from developing a stable, licit economy, providing rule of law to its citizens, and improving governance.

A key enabler that will improve the GOA's ability to deliver services to its people is to disconnect from the insurgency. Our strategy should effectively provide the necessary incentives to wean the people from the insurgeny and connect them with their government.

The drug trade provides a key revenue stream to the insurgency, as it provides weapons and funding that enable insurgent elements to continue their operational activites. Illegal drugs thrive in an environment of insecurity, and areas with limited government and legal economic alternatives. It it no accident that the vast majority of cultivation occurs in southern Afghanistan, where the insurgency is most active. In Helmand, over 66 percent of total cultivation occured in Helmand, which is Afghanistan's most violent province.

Disconnecting the Afghan people from the insurgency will require disconnecting the people from the drug trade. The enormity of the drug trade requires that our strategies be integrated with the larger counterinsurgnecy plan until Afghan law enforcement has the capacity to interdict illegal drug networks inside Afghanistan. The reduction in cultivation and production over the past few years is not the result of successful CN policies and strategies; it is the result of poor weather, lucrative economic alternatives, and key leadership in some areas of the country.

The goal of a

and then connect the people with their democratically elected government. In Afghanistan, the U.S. is engaged in a bidding war with insu